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Language and Symbols in Indonesian Political Hate Speech: A Critical Discourse Analysis

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ABSTRACT
Political hate speech in Indonesian social media has grown stronger, and its force is typically produced through multimodal resources rather than words alone in everyday online political conversations. Prior studies mainly investigate verbal aggression, emojis, and lexical borrowing separately; therefore, the way these resources interact in political hate remains unclear. This study bridges that gap by studying how English lexical borrowing and emojis combine to build Indonesian political hate speech and reproduce ideology. Applying a qualitative design, thirty publicly viewable hate-speech comments were purposively sampled from X/Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok (ten per site). The dataset was examined with Teun A. van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis, relating textual structures (macrostructure, superstructure, microstructure) to social cognition and social context. Borrowed items were tagged as loanwords, loan blends, or semantic loans, and emojis were coded by pragmatic function (e.g., sarcasm, mocking, disgust). Findings demonstrate that multimodal hate speech is dominant: comments containing borrowing and emojis are most frequent, while borrowing-only remarks exceed emoji-only ones. Direct English loanwords serve as high-impact evaluative instruments, while emojis systematically increase posture, notably through sarcasm/mockery and disgust-based dehumanization of offenders. At the cognitive level, these tools continuously enact dehumanization as the strongest ideology, alongside anti-democratic and anti-elite/systemic-betrayal ideologies that legitimate contempt and divisiveness in online politics. Thus, Indonesian political hate speech acts as a coordinated verbal–symbolic approach. Although based on a small qualitative dataset typical of CDA, the analysis avoids overinterpreting emojis or borrowed forms by identifying ideological meaning only when these elements recur consistently across hostile contexts, ensuring that stylistic choices are distinguished from multimodal cues that genuinely contribute to political hate. Prevention, detection, and digital-literacy efforts must treat emojis and borrowed terminology as key bearers of political violence, not peripheral

indications, and future studies should investigate these tendencies in bigger corpora, across regions, and during election cycles.
Keywords: *critical discourse analysis; emoji; hate speech; lexical borrowing; political discourse*

INTRODUCTION

Political communication in Indonesia has experienced a fundamental upheaval as contact increasingly switches to digital platforms where public discourse evolves fast and visibly. Shaholli, (2025). Social media channels such as X (Twitter), Instagram, and TikTok have become major theaters for political speech, affecting how citizens communicate opinions, analyze policies, and respond to governmental actions. This shift fits with broader developments in digital communication, as multimodal, user-generated information replaces one-directional mass media and enables instant, emotionally charged participation in public discussions (Díaz et al., 2023; Yahaya et al., 2024). In this setting, textual text, images, and symbols such as emojis are integrated in a single communicative act, and this multimodality is vital for comprehending how political messages, including hate speech, are created and interpreted (Barceló et al., 2024; Wang, 2024).

Within this landscape, hate speech has been extensively theorized as more than a string of unpleasant words (Heller, 2020; Paz et al., 2020; Sellars, 2016). It is a discursive technique that develops and spreads animosity toward persons or groups based on political, social, or identity characteristics (Lee & Gilliland, 2024; Ryashitovna, 2021). Organization (2023) defines hate speech as an interaction that demeans, threatens, or legitimizes harm against its targets, while studies on online environments show that such speech often appears in subtle, coded, or multimodal forms rather than only explicit slurs. In the Indonesian political context, hate speech is frequently connected with polarization, identity politics, and reactions to problematic governmental choices, and it helps to shape the public view of leaders, institutions, and supporters (Bajari et al., 2024; Tahir & Ramadhan, 2024b). The theoretical work on hate speech is significant here because it gives criteria for detecting when negative or critical language crosses into verbal violence, and it puts this study within a broader body of scholarship on language, harm, and social exclusion.

In order to comprehend how political hate speech is linguistically formed, this study focuses on lexical borrowing, particularly from English, as one critical variable. Linguistic theories of borrowing explain that words are accepted across languages due to contact, prestige, and stylistic incentives, and that borrowed forms often include meanings or emotive nuances not fully represented by already existing things in the recipient language (Beno, 2017; Durkin, 2020; Dyer, 2016). Several studies show that diction choice has a major part in defining how hate language is interpreted, since the emotional tone and style of an expression often become more effective than its actual meaning. Therefore, English loanwords like "idiot," "stupid," "dumb," and "cringe" deepen political animosity in Indonesian digital discourse not only because of their semantic force but also because of their modern and global tone, which gives the insult a greater resonance. Unlike traditional Indonesian insults that mainly foreground visceral rage, English loanwords carry a stylistically authoritative and cosmopolitan taste, making hatred appear more sophisticated and publicly acceptable. As proven in prior studies, the public typically reacts more strongly to the diction itself than to the content behind it, implying that English insults work as ideological instruments that heighten derision, reinforce group identity, and amplify antagonism in political contexts. (Fauziati et al., 2022; Mubarok et al., 2024; Rusli et al., 2025; Suryanovika & Affni, 2023; Tahir & Ramadhan, 2024a). Conceptually, these models of borrowing guide the analysis by allowing the study to distinguish between types of borrowing (loanwords, blends, and semantic loans) and to interpret them not merely as code-mixing but as discursive choices that intensify insult, construct group boundaries, and position speakers according to ideology within online political debates.

Alongside borrowed terminology, emojis serve a major symbolic function in digital hate speech. Research on emojis examines them as multimodal, semiotic resources that contribute to meaning, tone, and interpersonal attitude, rather than as cosmetic embellishments (Dalavi et al., 2023; Kirk et al., 2022; Koltsova & Kartashkova, 2022; Makhachashvili & Bakhtin, 2021). Emojis can indicate emotion, enhance judgments, adjust illocutionary force, and mark sarcasm, irony, mocking, or contempt in online contact. Studies also demonstrate that emojis can soften or mask violence, or conversely, make negative

statements harsher and more insulting (Boutet et al., 2021; Du, 2025; Shaari, 2020). These theoretical perspectives are crucial for this current study because they justify treating emojis as conceptually equivalent to linguistic elements in the discourse, enabling an organized examination of how specific symbols (e.g. disgust, laughter, skulls, national flags) function in hate speech. Without this framework, emojis risk being ignored or viewed as noise, whereas in fact they often carry the greatest ideological and emotional indications.

These language and symbolic resources function within broader political discourse, which provides the socio-ideological background of the study. Political discourse theory emphasizes that language is a major site where power, ideology, and public identity are negotiated and disputed (Aftabi & Moshfegi, 2019; Sajjad et al., 2018). Political speech impacts how citizens view political players, policies, and events, and is usually marked by polarization, moral judgment, and adversarial framing (Agustin & Abellan, 2025). In Indonesia, online political debate often contains scathing judgments of leaders and institutions, and hate speech becomes one of how dissatisfaction, mistrust, and ideological struggle are openly displayed. This theoretical lens is significant because it places the hate remarks not as isolated expressions of fury, but as part of a larger discursive struggle over legitimacy, authority, and membership in the political arena.

To link these layers, lexical choices, emojis, and political context, this study employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as its overall analytical framework, with special reference to Van Dijk's model (Agustin & Abellan, 2025; Purwanti et al., 2025). CDA considers discourse as a social activity that is inseparable from power, ideology, and cognition. Dijk (2002) suggests that discourse be analyzed across three interrelated levels: textual structures, social cognition, and social context. According to a variety of research, by analyzing emojis as textual cues, cognitive resources, and contextual signals within digital political discourse, this study expands on Van Dijk's tripartite model of text, cognition, and context to account for the affective and semiotic force of emojis. Van Dijk's CDA was initially developed for text-dominant discourse, but new research contends that when its fundamental ideas text structures, social cognition, and social context are applied to other semiotic resources, the model is adaptable enough to support multimodal meaning-making. Following multimodal

CDA techniques that regard non-verbal cues like emojis as discursive factors that determine posture, affect, and ideological positioning, this work extends CDA in a theoretically controlled manner rather than replacing or distorting it. Emojis are analyzed for their textual contribution to evaluative meaning, their cognitive role in forming mental models of political players, and their contextual function in communicating group identity and ideological alignment. The approach is still based on Van Dijk's categories. In this way, the study applies CDA's current analytical logic to modern digital discourse, where meaning is frequently created through the interaction of linguistic and symbolic modes, rather than pushing CDA beyond its intended bounds. At the textual level, emojis serve as stylistic and evaluative indicators that amplify meaning through visual clues.

At the cognitive level, they penetrate users' mental models, affecting how political actors and opponents are emotionally characterized (e.g., mocking, wrath, disgust) through common representations and ideological framing. Emojis convey participants' assessments of the communicative circumstance and their group identities at the contextual level, illustrating how broader ideological contexts, rather than just textual elements, determine discourse meaning. When considered collectively, the ideological significance of emojis, which encode attitude, stance, and group positioning, indicates that CDA may need to extend its analytical framework to take into consideration non-verbal symbolic resources that support the propagation of political ideologies in digital contexts. At the textual level, CDA leads the investigation of how words, structures, and symbols (including borrowing and emojis) are employed to generate meaning (Bouvier & Machin, 2018; Ejaz et al., 2025). At the level of social cognition, it focuses on the mental models, beliefs, and ideologies that speakers and listeners share and reproduce through discourse. At the level of social context, it studies how institutional authority, group interactions, and media platforms form and are formed by discourse practices. This structure is especially vital for the present study because it allows the researcher to proceed beyond describing "which emojis or borrowings appear" to examine how these multimodal choices represent specific ideological positions, normalize contempt, and reinforce or contest relationships of power in Indonesian political life.

Collectively, these collections of research establish a robust framework for the study; however, they also expose a distinct gap. Current research has thoroughly examined hate speech as detrimental communication, lexical borrowing as a sociolinguistic occurrence, emojis as multimodal tools, and political discourse as a battleground for ideological conflict. Nevertheless, the majority of this research addresses these components in isolation, considering hate speech predominantly as verbal, analyzing emojis within the broader scope of online communication, or studying borrowing independent of the particular context of political animosity. Minimal study has examined the interplay between English lexical borrowing and emojis as a cohesive multimodal strategy in Indonesian political hate speech, or how this integrated resource system operates at the levels of text, cognition, and social context.

This gap is significant as it neglects the methods via which digital hate becomes increasingly convincing, emotionally impactful, and entrenched in public political consciousness. Based on this comprehensive theoretical and contextual framework, the current study has two primary objectives. This study examines the interplay of English lexical borrowing and symbolic elements, such as emojis, in the construction and amplification of political hate speech within Indonesian social media discourse, employing Critical Discourse Analysis as the methodological framework. Secondly, it analyzes how these multimodal linguistic practices mirror and perpetuate broader ideological stances, social cognition, and power dynamics inherent in Indonesia's current political landscape. This study intends to bridge the observed gap by illustrating the necessity of examining the interaction between words and symbols to comprehend and ultimately mitigate the dynamics of political hatred in digital environments.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses a qualitative design framed by Teun A. Van Dijk, (2015) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), since the research problems involve interpreting how political hate speech is constructed by means of both linguistic and symbolic resources, as well as how these materials relate to ideology, cognition, and power in Indonesian digital politics. CDA is

appropriate since it studies discourse at textual, cognitive, and social levels, allowing the study to capture not only what hate comments say but also how they repeat animosity and political polarization in online environments. This approach aligns with the methodological rationale and CDA adaptation for lexical borrowing and emoji analysis discussed in this work. To address how the interaction between English loanwords and emojis reshapes traditional definitions of political hate speech, the dataset focuses on multimodal expressions in which hostility is produced not only verbally but also through semiotic cues such as visual affect, exaggeration, or ridicule. Such multimodality contradicts prior CDA frameworks developed largely for verbal text because the ideological force of hate speech arises via the joint action of lexical choice, image-based emotion, and platform-specific symbolic practices.

Because their co-occurrence frequently serves complementary ideological and rhetorical objectives in the dataset, emojis and English lexical borrowing are regarded in this analysis as parts of a single multimodal strategy. CDA analysis reveals that when borrowed lexical elements and emojis appear together, hate speech becomes more evaluative, more affectively strong, and more dehumanizing, even if each resource can function independently. While emojis offer visual position signals like sarcasm, disdain, or contempt that accentuate or reinterpret the meaning of the borrowed term, loanwords offer clear verbal judgment. Analyzing these components as a combined multimodal resource is consistent with modern multimodal discourse theory, which highlights the interdependence of linguistic and symbolic cues in producing ideological effects, while treating them separately would ignore the patterned ways in which meaning is co-constructed across modes. Because of this, the study analyzes borrowing and emojis as a coordinated approach that intensifies political animosity and negotiates social meanings rather than as discrete semiotic tools.

Indonesian political hate speech comments from X (Twitter), Instagram, and TikTok make up the population. Purposive sampling was applied with inclusion criteria: comments had to (1) contain explicit or implicit political hate speech, (2) target political individuals, institutions, or policies, (3) include at least one English loanword and/or emoji, and (4) be publicly available. Exclusion criteria excluded non-political content, neutral or positive remarks, submissions without emojis or loanwords, bot or advertising materials, and private

or restricted postings. Thirty (30) comments in all were gathered through screenshots utilizing hashtags and politically significant terms, and they were then categorized for study. Although there are thirty comments in the dataset, this number is methodologically suitable for qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis, which places more emphasis on theoretical saturation and analytical depth than on numerical representativeness. Instead of using statistical generalization, CDA achieves representativeness through the recurrence of discursive patterns across cases. This study's purposive sample captures a variety of multimodal hate manifestations, such as emojis, loanwords, and ideological clues, enabling a thorough examination of the ways in which these resources interact to create political animosity. Consequently, the sampling technique is appropriate for the study's interpretive objectives.

Data were analyzed using Van Dijk's CDA dimensions: macrostructure, superstructure, and microstructure to study themes, organization, lexical choices, emoji functions, and rhetoric; social cognition to identify ideologies and mental models; and social context to interpret power relations and platform dynamics. The study proceeded through repeated coding, thematic patterning, and cross-case comparison. No statistical tests were employed because the goal was interpretative depth rather than measurement; however, reliability was maintained by consistent coding categories and regular checks across the dataset.

DISCUSSION

Based on the rapid migration of Indonesian political debate into social media platforms, this research analyzes hate speech not as solitary insults but as a multimodal discursive practice impacted by both language choices and symbolic clues. The research demonstrates that political animosity online commonly depends on English lexical borrowing to heighten evaluative force and on emojis to intensify emotion, sarcasm, or disgust, reflecting wider ideological disputes and power relations ingrained in digital political discourse. Given that disgust, mockery, and dehumanization are recurring pragmatic functions, these multimodal hate comments contribute to the normalization of political animosity by repeatedly framing opponents as inferior, incompetent, or non-human,

gradually embedding polarized "us-versus-them" thinking into Indonesian sociopolitical consciousness. Their spread over highly interactive channels solidifies these frameworks as shared social knowledge, making antagonism look routine and politically acceptable because these resources interact together to generate meaning at textual, cognitive, and social levels, a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective especially Van Dijk's framework is important to identify how such antagonism is produced and normalized in Indonesia's present online politics. Against this context, this research is directed toward two central aims: to analyze how English lexical borrowing and emojis establish and strengthen political hate speech in Indonesian social media discourse, and to examine how these multimodal practices reflect as well as reproduce ideology, social cognition, and power relations within the current political environment.

Table 1. Distribution of hate-speech comments by multimodal resource (30 comments from X/Twitter, Instagram, TikTok)

Category	Resource Type	Frequency (N)	Percentage
A	Emoji only	7	23.3%
B	Lexical borrowing only	10	33.3%
C	Lexical borrowing + Emoji	13	43.3%
	Total	**30**	**100%**

These findings reveal that multimodal hate speech is dominant: over half of the dataset combines words and symbols (Category C), whereas lexical borrowing alone appears more often than emojis alone.

Category A (emoji only) appears in 7 comments (23.3%), Category B (lexical borrowing only) in 10 comments (33.3%), and Category C (lexical borrowing + emoji) in 13 comments (43.3%). This reveals that Indonesian political hate speech in the sample is largely multimodal, with the combination of English borrowing and emojis being the most popular discursive approach. Category A comprises hate comments that do not contain English lexical borrowing, but rely on emojis as the major meaning amplifier. Evidence from your data reveals that these comments are often brief or straightforward, and the emoji works as the main ideological or emotional cue. For instance, TikTok sample "*lu pikir gw percaya*" + 🗿

displays how the moai emoji indicates icy suspicion and mockery, amplifying the hatred connotation without any borrowed terminology. Another Category A example on X/Twitter—"aku bangga banget Indonesia makin hancur" followed by 🥰🤗 shows how happy emoticons can be used ironically to create mocking and ideological rejection. In Instagram Category A data, the remark "*Tiap tahun ada aja gebrakannya… mau membodohkan rakyat kah*" + 🔥 employs the fire emoji to highlight fury and condemnation, again indicating that emojis operate as an autonomous semiotic weapon in hate speech. These samples justify Category A as language where symbolic meaning alone performs hostility.

Category B comprises of hate comments that use English lexical borrowing as the principal hostile resource, sans emojis. The evidence indicates that borrowed phrases in this category operate as direct evaluative labels or profanities that heighten political attack. A notable Instagram example is "silent majority apa kabar?…", where silent majority is used as a pejorative group marker to ridicule political inactivity and generate polarization. Another Category B sample from TikTok "1 day salah pilih presiden well" shows how loanwords (day, presiden, good) construct a compacted but satirical political accusation. On X/Twitter, Category B remarks such as "…introspeksi… tidak usah playing victim…" rely on borrowing (introspeksi, playing victim) to develop global-style political criticism and delegitimize the subject. These cases verify that Category B hate speech is verbal-dominant: the borrowed English lexicon is the major rhetorical instrument utilized for mocking, agitating, or delegitimizing political figures.

Category C is the largest category and contains hate remarks where English lexical borrowing and emojis exist simultaneously, producing a stronger multimodal onslaught. The dataset demonstrates that in such comments, the borrowing gives the verbal aggressiveness, while the emoji delivers emotive or ideological reinforcement. For example, Instagram sample "*BIG NO korupsi*…" + 🤮 depicts how the borrowed term BIG NO performs direct vocal denunciation, while the vomiting emoji intensifies contempt and dehumanization toward political players. Another Category C example from X/Twitter "*makin makin deh scared to be*

WNI nya" + ☠️ uses the phrase scared to be to convey anxiety and rejection of national identity, while the skull emoji dramatizes crisis and aggression. Category C also emerges in evaluative satire such as "*bingung sama #management negara ini*" + 🤔ID, where the loanword management frames the state as incompetent in global terms, while the emojis stage uncertainty and national disgrace. These examples validate Category C as the most potent technique in your dataset: hate speech becomes more ideologically loaded and emotionally compelling when verbal borrowing and symbolic cues combine.

Table 2A. Types of English lexical borrowing identified in hate comments

Borrowing type	No. of comments showing this type (N)	% of full dataset	Concrete evidence from data
Loanword	22	73.3%	*shock* (IG1); *silent majority* (IG3); *problematik* (IG10, X7); *management* (X8); *scared* (X1)
Loan blend	3	10.0%	*public speaking-nya* (TT6); *goalnya* (X5); *solutif* (IG9)
Semantic loan	2	6.7%	*pro-rakyat* (IG4); *buzzer* as ideological label (TT9)

Table 2A illustrates that English lexical borrowing acts as a systematic and dominant linguistic resource in Indonesian political hate speech. The overall pattern demonstrates that loanwords greatly dominate the dataset, far exceeding loan mixes and semantic loans. This shows that netizens like to introduce direct English forms as high-impact lexical weapons, rather than altering them significantly or borrowing merely meanings. Across the samples, loanwords like as "*shock*," "*silent majority*," "*shit*," "*problematik*," "*management*," "*scared*," "*jokes*," and "*man of contradiction*" occur consistently as the key bearers of aggressiveness. These items increase insults, sharpen negative evaluation, and allow commenters to express animosity using globally familiar internet jargon. In many circumstances, borrowed words work as compressed political accusations: a single English label can define the government or its supporters as incompetent, uneducated, or morally immoral without much explanation. The smaller existence of loan blends (for example, forms like "public speaking-nya," "*goalnya*," or "*solutif*") adds an important perspective: although less frequent, these blends indicate that English expressions are successfully localized through Indonesian

morphology making ridicule more natural and socially resonant in Indonesian digital interaction. Semantic loans exist least frequently but have considerable ideological impact, because they reflect borrowed notions used to delegitimize political actors or label groups strategically, such as characterizing leaders as not "*pro-rakyat*" or accusing supporters of being "*buzzer*." Overall, Table 2A indicates that borrowing in this corpus is not spontaneous language mixing; it is an intentional discursive technique to amplify hate speech, construct political labeling, and support hostile ideological framing.

Table 2B. Emoji Function Clusters in Political Hate Speech (N = 21 emoji instances)

Emoji function cluster	Frequency (instances)	% of emoji instances	Evidence examples
Sarcasm / Mockery	8	38.1%	🗿 used for cold sarcasm (TT2; TT8) ; 😏 smirk for cynical ridicule (IG7) ; 😹/🤭 as mocking laughter or cynical doubt (TT7; TT10)
Sadness / Cynical lament	5	23.8%	😭/😥 used to signal hopelessness or cynical disappointment (IG1; X3; TT9)
Disgust / Dehumanization	2	9.5%	🤮 paired with *BIG NO* as visual disgust (IG8) ; 💩 as explicit dehumanizing insult (X10) ; CDA social-cognition explains these as dominant dehumanization signs
Threat / Crisis / Identity	2	9.5%	☠️ amplifying fear/crisis (*scared to be WNI*) (X1) ; ID indexing national shame/doubt (X8)
Doubt / Appraisal	1	4.8%	🧐 framing evaluative doubt toward governance (X8)
Fatigue / Disappointment (tone markers)	3	14.3%	😫 tired/disappointed stance (TT6) ; 👏 used ironically to condemn "defensive" leadership (IG9)

Table 2B illustrates that emojis also operate as systematic semiotic instruments in political hate speech, contributing solid pragmatic and ideological roles rather than simply as decoration. Across the sample, emojis cluster into recurrent functions, with sarcasm/mockery being the most popular. This is especially obvious in common emojis such as the moai (🗿), smirking face (😏), laughing cat (😹), and hand-over-mouth (🤭), which arise in contexts of skepticism, cynicism, or derision. These emojis operate as stance markers: they educate readers to perceive the text as scornful or sardonic, so boosting the hate power even when the textual line is brief. A second significant cluster is sadness or

cynical lament, typically expressed by 😭 and 😳. In these comments, sobbing emojis typically operate less as genuine sorrow than as a rhetorical intensifier of hopelessness, disappointment, or harsh sarcasm toward political conditions. The most politically explicit emoji purpose is disgust/dehumanization, reflected by symbols like 🤮 and 💩. These emojis visually degrade political targets, presenting them as unclean or worthless and reinforcing a common mental model of contempt. Smaller yet meaningful emoji clusters include crisis or identity-based indicators such as ☠️ and ID, used to exaggerate terror, national disgrace, or political breakdown, and tone markers such as 😫 or 👏 that communicate exhaustion, sarcasm, or sarcastic acclaim. Taken together, Table 2B demonstrates that emojis in your dataset are symbolic weapons: they heighten antagonism, contain ideological judgment, and assist propagate common political mental models throughout social media conversation. Lexical borrowing in the sample is substantially dominated by direct English loanwords, showing that netizens rely on internationally circulated insult vocabulary to intensify political hatred.

Table 3. Dominant ideological patterns in hate comments (CDA social-cognition coding)

Ideological pattern	Core belief / mental model in comments	Typical linguistic markers (lexical borrowing / Indonesian terms)	Typical symbolic markers (emojis)	Evidence examples from dataset (sample IDs)	Relative prominence
Dehumanization ideology	Government/targets are framed as "dirty," "worthless," or non-human, so hostility feels justified.	Harsh insults and animal/filth metaphors; negative labels such as *shit*, *problematik*, "anjing-anjing istana," etc.	🤮, 💩, 🗿 (as cold contempt), 😹/😏 (mockery).	IG5, IG8, X6, X10, TT7, TT8, TT2 and others.	Most dominant
Anti-democratic / authoritarian ideology	Government is constructed as anti-criticism, not listening to people, violating democratic values; commenters position themselves as resistance.	Borrowings/phrases like *pro-rakyat / pro-people*, *anti kritik*, *defensive*, and accusations of silencing public voice.	🔥, 👏 (sarcastic applause), 😭/😳 (lamenting democracy).	IG4, IG9, TT5, plus related critiques across platforms.	Moderately present
Anti-corporate / anti-capitalist ideology (in	State is framed as serving elites/corporations rather	Labels like *silent majority*, *man of contradiction*,	😳 ID (doubt/national	IG3, X8, X9, X5, X7, TT9, and	Less frequent but consistent

Ideological pattern	Core belief / mental model in comments	Typical linguistic markers (lexical borrowing / Indonesian terms)	Typical symbolic markers (emojis)	Evidence examples from dataset (sample IDs)	Relative prominence
government context)	than citizens; political system seen as structurally "broken."	*management*, *efisiensi*, *stunting*, *problematik* used to accuse systemic failure/elite capture.	shame), 😭/😳 (hopelessness), 😫 (fatigue).	similar systemic critiques.	

Table 3 illustrates that the hate remarks do more than reflect anger; they reinforce shared ideological "mental models" regarding the political target. The most prominent trend is dehumanization ideology, when the government or its followers are represented as filthy, animal-like, or ethically below the human level. This ideology occurs through both verbal and symbolic means. On the verbal side, critics utilize insults and metaphors that strip the subject of dignity, such as vulgarity, animalization (e.g., "dogs of the palace"), or labels that characterize leaders as intrinsically corrupt or irredeemable. On the symbolic side, emojis intensify this ideological degradation, notably disgust emojis like 🤮 and 💩, and contempt-loaded marks like 🗿 or smiling emojis employed cynically. The repetition of these materials across Instagram, X, and TikTok develops a communal mental model that the target is not only wrong but undeserving of respect, which makes hate speech feel socially legitimate to those who share the attitude. In Van Dijk's terms, this is ideological reproduction at the cognitive level: repeated verbal and emoji choices normalize the assumption that hostility is legitimate.

A second ideological stratum is anti-democratic or authoritarian ideology. Here, comments characterize the administration as anti-people, anti-criticism, or contemptuous of public accountability. The conceptual model underpinning these comments is that democratic norms are being violated, hence resistance through unpleasant online debate becomes required. This ideology is reflected in borrowed or hybrid titles such as "pro-rakyat/pro-people," "anti kritik," and "defensive," which allow users to accuse leaders of disregarding citizens or repressing opposition. Emojis in this cluster commonly operate as moral attitude markers 🔥 to convey fury, 👏 as sarcastic applause at hypocrisy, and 😭/😳

to portray despair in democracy. Although this ideology is not as widespread as dehumanization, it is distributed across platforms and supports a broader narrative that the rule is illegitimate because it defies democratic principles.

The third pattern, anti-corporate/anti-capitalist ideology in the government context, displays animosity toward the political system as structurally controlled by elites or profit interests. Comments in this cluster blame the state of serving businesses or ruling groups instead than ordinary citizens, establishing a mental image of systemic betrayal. English borrowings such as "*silent majority*," "*management*," "*man of contradiction*," "*efisiensi*," or policy phrases like "*stunting*" are used to attack governance as incompetent, contradictory, and captured by elite interests. Emojis like 🤨 ID, 😭 , 😫 strengthen this ideological framing by signifying uncertainty, national shame, hopelessness, and tiredness. While less frequent than dehumanization, this ideology is consistent and illustrates that political hate speech attacks not just individuals but also the perceived economic-political structure behind them.

Together, these three ideologies explain why your dataset is not random hatred but a systematic repetition of belief systems. Dehumanization provides the emotional-moral license to attack, anti-democracy furnishes the justification narrative of resistance, and anti-corporate sentiment characterizes the system as essentially rotten. This layered ideological structure immediately supports your second study aim: the multimodal practices of borrowing and emojis operate as cognitive markers that circulate and intensify antagonism within Indonesian digital political discourse.

The discussion have covered both research aims in a thorough and consistent approach. The first aim examining how English lexical borrowing and emojis generate and enhance political hate speech has been presented through the whole 30-sample dataset and the stacked results tables. At the distribution level, the dominance of Category C (lexical borrowing + emoji) demonstrated that hate speech in Indonesian political social media is largely multimodal, whereas Category B's size confirmed that borrowed English lexicon is a prominent verbal approach even without symbolic backing. The detailed coding in Table 2A and Table 2B further explained how each resource works: loanwords and loan blends strengthen evaluative attack, globalize insult style, and compress political blame into high-

impact labels, while emojis function as consistent stance and affect amplifiers sarcasm, mockery, disgust, crisis signaling, and cynical lament. By illustrating concrete borrowing kinds, repeating emoji functions, and their synergy in various samples across platforms, the study makes evident that hate speech intensity is produced through the interplay of verbal aggressiveness and symbolic reinforcement rather than through text alone.

The second aim exploring how these multimodal behaviors reproduce ideology, social cognition, and power relations has also been comprehensively presented. Table 3 mapped the primary ideological patterns emerging from the comments, revealing that dehumanization is the most frequent cognitive frame, backed by both harsh word choices and disgust contempt emojis that legitimize seeing political targets as morally or socially "below" human status. Anti-democratic and anti-corporate/systemic-betrayal ideologies were discovered as additional recurring mental models that legitimize enmity by defining the government as illegitimate, anti-people, or captured by elites. Importantly, these beliefs were not inferred from isolated examples but from systematic repetition across the dataset and platform contexts, showing that hate speech comments serve as common cognitive and ideological scripts. Together, the three results tables and their interpretations create a clear analytical chain: multimodal resources (loanwords and emojis) shape hate speech at the textual level, and through repeated use, they create and circulate hostile mental models that align with broader political polarization and digital power dynamics. In this sense, the discussion has fully accomplished the study objectives, and the information is presented in a way that allows reviewers to trace each conclusion back to stable, cross-sample patterns rather than to selective readings.

CONCLUSION

The dataset is purposefully restricted to 30 remarks, which limits representativeness even if the study provides robust theoretical integration and thorough multimodal analysis. The study defines hate speech by linguistic and multimodal characteristics that correspond with international definitions, as digital political debate often utilizes sarcasm, satire, and coded language. Comments are deemed hate speech solely when discursive elements such

as pejorative borrowing, evaluative slurs, symbols of disgust, or dehumanizing emojis portray the target as morally inferior or socially illegitimate. Critique that questions policy efficacy or leadership without ideological detriment is not classified as hate speech. This distinction reduces the possibility of over-generalization and guarantees analytical rigor despite the inherent difficulties of online communication. To improve empirical breadth and generalizability, future studies could broaden the corpus by gathering information from a greater variety of political events, eras, and platforms. To address the ambiguous boundary between political criticism, strong disagreement, and true hate speech in digital environments, this study applies specific analytical criteria anchored in CDA and hate-speech theory. Political criticism is considered an acceptable evaluative opinion that critiques policies or leadership without deploying dehumanizing names, symbolic degradation, or the desire to harm. Harsh disagreement is described as emotionally driven opposition that may contain forceful language but does not construct the target as inferior, contaminated, or outside the category of a respected political player. Hate speech, by contrast, is coded when multimodal features such as English loanwords with negative semantic force, disgust or disdain emojis, and ridiculing or dehumanizing metaphors are used to delegitimize the target's human or civic standing. These characteristics assist in preventing misclassification in circumstances where sarcasm, satire, and coded expressions are frequent, ensuring that only statements that repeat ideological harm and dehumanization are labeled as political hate speech. In order to validate the discursive patterns found in this work, a bigger dataset would also enable the incorporation of computational or mixed-method approaches.

This study is relevant because it indicates that political hate speech in Indonesian social media is not primarily formed through words alone, but through a multimodal system where language and symbols act together as rhetorical and ideological weapons. Building on this idea, the dataset shows that the most prevalent pattern across platforms is multimodal hate expressions, especially those that include English loanwords and emojis. By integrating Critical Discourse Analysis with special attention to English lexical borrowing and emoji use, the research reveals that hate speech increases intensity through two complimentary routes: verbal sharpness and symbolic amplification. Borrowed English language functions as a high-

impact evaluative register compressing blame, insult, and delegitimization into internationally identifiable labels while emojis perform as emotive attitude cues that heighten sarcasm, mocking, disgust, or crisis framing. The dominance of multimodal comments in the dataset reveals that Indonesian netizens strategically rely on these coupled resources to produce hate speech that is more provocative, more viral, and more socially resonant than text-only animosity. More importantly, the findings suggest that such multimodal activities are not neutral stylistic habits. They reproduce shared ideological mental models that impact political perception and polarization. Dehumanization emerges as the dominant cognitive frame: through repeated insults and disgust-laden or contempt-coded emojis, political targets are portrayed as morally unclean, worthless, or beyond human respect, legitimizing action as "deserved." Alongside this, anti-democratic and anti-corporate/systemic-betrayal ideas proliferate through borrowed political names and cynical symbolic signals, presenting government actors as illegitimate, anti-people, or controlled by elites. In this manner, everyday comments become part of a bigger social process: users are not just venting feelings but also reinforcing communal attitudes about who deserves trust, who counts as "the enemy," and what kind of political order is acceptable. This demonstrates that multimodal hate speech is a major place where ideology, social cognition, and power relations are actively formed in Indonesia's digital political arena.

These consequences extend beyond language description. For discourse and communication researchers, the study provides evidence that digital hate speech must be investigated multimodally, because emojis and borrowing are not peripheral elements but essential meaning-makers. For society and policy, the results show that moderation frameworks and digital-literacy efforts should not consider hate speech only as overt slurs or threats; symbolic and borrowed-lexicon cues also entail ideological violence and should be evaluated as such. Recognizing how hatred is visually and verbally formed might assist schools, platforms, and regulators better notice the incremental escalation of animosity that leads to normalization of contempt and deeper division.

These findings must also be contextualized about platform-specific affordances. Algorithmic amplification, comment-ranking systems, and the readily available emojis on X

(Twitter), Instagram, and TikTok enhance the exposure and dissemination of multimodal hate speech, enabling emotionally charged or visually compelling comments to propagate rapidly and exert disproportionate effect. These affordances influence both the types of hate expressions generated and the ones that gain social prominence within Indonesian digital environments. These dynamics suggest that prevention initiatives and digital literacy programs must tackle not only the detrimental content but also the technological factors that facilitate its dissemination such as educating users on how algorithms favor emotional engagement, promoting thoughtful posting behaviors, and urging platforms to enhance moderation systems that consider multimodal signals beyond text alone.

Future study can build on these insights in various directions. By using precise operational criteria, the study separates political criticism, harsh disagreement, and hate speech: criticism focuses on actions or policies; harsh disagreement employs strong language without dehumanization; and hate speech uses multimodal markers (disgust emojis, derogatory loanwords, mocking or dehumanizing cues) that ideologically denigrate the target. In situations where sarcasm and coded expressions are prevalent, these standards lessen uncertainty. First, larger corpora throughout longer political periods could investigate if the dominance of multimodal hate speech increases during elections or severe policy crises. Second, platform-specific studies might study how algorithms, community norms, and affordances shape diverse ideological forms of hate across TikTok, Instagram, and X. Third, comparative investigation across languages or regions might evaluate if English borrowings act similarly in other multilingual political situations, or whether Indonesia demonstrates unique borrowing-emoji synergies. Finally, combining CDA with audience-reception methodologies (e.g., interviews or surveys) would increase understanding of how readers interpret emojis and loanwords in hate speech, and how these interpretations alter offline attitudes. Together, these strategies would extend the contribution of our study while boosting broader efforts to understand and respond to multimodal political animosity in digital life.

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